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1. INTRODUCTION
Aristotle reminds us that the human being is not only a rational animal, but also a
story-telling animal. And those stories (represented through the dramas of the
Poetics) must have a certain structure and an internal logic, following by means of
what is necessary or probable. Narratives that violate such principles, that are
improbable or otherwise “irrational;” will not have the appropriate effect on an
audience. Audiences will not learn from them (always a concern in Aristotle’s
practical works), and they certainly will not be persuaded by them.
This plea for narrative probability is reinforced by Paula Olmos’ scholarly
journey, tracing the tensions between narration and argumentation, from the early
place of narratio in the parts of speeches to the parallels with the informal logician’s
treatment of explanation, and current debates over fiction versus non-fiction. Along
the way she highlights the importance of the pragmatic context, which leads her to
reject the fiction/non-fiction distinction and establishes the need for an
argumentative theory of narrative probabilitas that serves the demands of modern
theories of argumentation. There is much to explore in her detailed analysis; I will
focus on just a few points related to the veracity of factual discourse and the
plausibility of narratives.
2. CONCEPTS OF NARRATION
The early accounts of the narratio are understood in terms of a setting out of the
facts. This certainly differs from the fictive telling of a story that tries to draw an
audience in through some lesson learned or an illustrated claim. Each of these very
different uses of narration, though, indicates the kinds of barriers that have been
erected by argumentation theorists to prevent the treatment of narratives as
arguments or at least to police the situation with strict conditions that would have
to be met before the narrative qualifies. Essentially, these conditions reduce to
demands that narratives fit the structure of arguments in order to qualify. That is,
they must have a claim and supporting premises. This fits the definition provided by
Kvernbekk, for example, in her paper “Narratives as informal arguments” (2003)
and what Govier and Ayers (2012) describe as the “core” of an argument. Of course,
in identifying a core, they also suggest that there are non-core elements, and this
they provide in a footnote: emotional indicators, counter-considerations, and also
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jokes or illustrative anecdotes (2012, p. 166n.9). In fact, a fuller exploration of that
footnote, were we to have time for it, might well find a case for the narrative in the
argument. But as long as the core criterion dominates in accounts such as those of
Kvernbekk and Govier & Ayers, then the analyst can demand of the text, ‘what are
the premises?’, and in the absence of a suitable response, reject the candidate. In a
sense, the problem is similar to the treatment of images as arguments. The
difference, of course, lies in the discourse-basis of the narrative and the different
genres involved. But this just serves to identify the frustration experienced when
trying to account for narratives in terms of the genre of argumentation. Because if
we do identify the premises and the claim they support, then we have indeed an
argument. But what is left of the narrative? It has been absorbed in the argument
(one genre consumed by the other.) Or, more to the point, what is left that is of
importance for the narrative to contribute in evaluating the strength of the
discourse? What much of this suggests is that whether narratives can work as
arguments will depend very much on how we construe ‘argument’.
In this light, the observed parallels with the treatment of explanations are
indeed useful. Informal logicians do evaluate these pragmatically, in terms of the
end that a discourse attempts to achieve.1 Like arguments, explanations offer
reasons, and so a better appreciation of the “space of reasons” may reveal the ways
in which statements operate as reasons in relation to an end at which a speaker or
writer aims. This may not tell us what kinds of reasons narrative statements
provide, but at least the parallel serves not to dismiss narratives out of hand.
Likewise, the ideas drawn from Agricola are particularly useful insofar as he
is the source of a compelling account of how plausible expositions with persuasive
ends fit into the wider scope of argumentative discourse (rather than the restrictive
structures of informal arguments). This points to a common persuasive end for a
range of discourse types—arguments, explanations, narratives—and ways in which
they are unified by that end. In a sense, this suggests that the attempt to see
narratives as arguments (as if arguments occupied a higher position on a hierarchy,
and other discourse types aspired to reach such heights) is mistaken. Instead, both
arguments and narratives (and explanations, and images) can operate
argumentatively insofar as they aim to persuade. (There may be other aims, but we
can restrict our attention to one for the present.) What matters, then, is the
probabilitas, credibility or plausibility involved.
3. FACTS AND THE PLAUSIBILITY OF NARRATIVES
It is interesting to read of Zabarella’s dismissal of History because it conveys “the
mere narration of facts” (p. 9). I think Olmos captures well what is wrong with such
an interpretation, although it is worth emphasizing. Indeed, if the narration of facts
is just an objective description about a state of affairs with which no one might
disagree, then it would be hard to read such descriptions as in any way
argumentative. But it is exactly when we are given competing descriptions (when
1

Kvernbekk (2003) briefly discusses the status of narratives as explanations (p. 10).
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we choose one newspaper over its competitor) that we expect a case to be conveyed
through the narration of events. In argumentation theory we no longer think that
“the facts speak for themselves,” as old funding grants used to suggest. The facts
have no voice; it is the writer or speaker who gives them voice, and in so doing that
writer or speaker takes a stand on the facts.
From the perspective of rhetorical argumentation, what is at stake relates to
the choices involved: how will the “facts” of a case be presented? Which point should
be stated first, and how will their order and arrangement effect their reception? A
similar idea is now captured in the extended version of pragma-dialectics, with the
introduction of rhetoric through strategic maneuvering. The arguer makes key
selections about the topic from those available, including which of the available
information will be included. Whenever “facts” are conveyed in a narrative, then, we
look for the choices that have been made (of inclusion and exclusion) because those
choices, and hence the narration that is constructed, are argumentative. This is, I
believe, the point Olmos has in mind when she writes: “if the pragmatic criterion
applies and these narratives are discursive means to make us decide about facts
under discussion, their believability would be put forward just in order to defend
their being good (the best available) portraits of reality” (p. 10). We might only
consider adding two provisos to this: that the “if” is unnecessary, since the
pragmatic criterion should always apply (there will always be rhetorical choices
involved); and, secondly, even where the intention that is hinted at here is not
conscious in the writer or speaker, we are still being given an interpretation of the
facts. The very act of giving voice to facts in a narrative is an act of interpretation.
My second more general comment relates to the nature of plausibility, or
credibility, to the narrative probabilitas that is being advocated and developed in the
paper. Again, we are clearly operating in the rhetorical dimension, because
plausibility is an audience concern. We might imagine a general sense of what is
plausible, in the abstract, but the idea operates more coherently in smaller
communities. Narration is, after all, a way of personalizing argumentation, creating a
sense of communion between arguer and audience.
Yet still the concept of ‘plausibility’ must be given some content, and this is
attempted in the paper. Various ideas contribute to the profile: “Believability” (the
central element); “consistent with phenomena” and “free from contradiction” (these
from Agricola); “characteristics which are accustomed to appear in real life” (from
Cicero); the internal coherence of the events, and the external coherence with
shared assumptions about behaviour (from Plumer); and some mix of veracity and
verisimilitude issues from Olmos’ disagreement with Plumer. From such a set of
non-exhaustive ideas we could then determine ways to evaluate narratives, beyond
their “logic.”2
What seems most advocated here, in the paper in question, is the plausibility
of narratives judged as “coherent wholes.” Now, such coherence can be internal or
external, or both, and I suspect it is the dual aspect that is important. But the same
Walter Fisher offers similar ideas in his narrative paradigm, (which is both argumentative and
literary, 1987, p. 58) with his specific notions of narrative rationality (p. 66) and, most importantly,
fidelity (p. 105ff.).
2
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kind of ideas are not common to both types of coherence. Internally, we can accept
very different worlds if the ideas are consistent and non-contradictory, and
explained in terms of themselves. Externally, we move centrally to the audience that
judges, and here the narrative must fit their expectations of the world, their
understanding of what can and cannot happen, what makes sense. But here the
account needs to find ways to accommodate a clearly argumentative type of
narrative popular with philosophers—the thought experiment or hypothetical case.
I have in mind here someone like Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971) and her story of the
hooked-up violinist (“It sounds plausible. But now let me ask you to imagine this.
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an
unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist” p. 48). The conceit requires
the reader to put herself in a situation which is not plausible, and see what follows
logically from there. It has internal coherence, but it does not fit with what we know
about the external. And, yet, Thomson expects a conclusion to be drawn about the
“real” world. Or more radically, there is Derek Parfit’s (1984) ‘teletransporter’
narrative, right out of an episode of Star Trek, by which he expects his audience to
be persuaded about his account of personhood. (“I enter the Teletransporter. I have
been to Mars before, but only by the old method…When I press the button, I shall
lose consciousness, and then wake up at what seems a moment later” p. 191.) This
kind of narration, with its clear argumentative intention, is a challenge for the
plausibility account.
So perhaps the criteria are loose and apply differently to different kinds of
narrative. Or perhaps narrative draws most of its argumentative power from its
contributory nature, being given in addition to an argument (like Protagoras in the
dialogue named after him, presenting his case first as a Great Myth, and then as a
logical argument). What matters is that narratives not be included from having an
important role in argumentation, broadly conceived, and that papers such as this
continue to explore that role.
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